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RETHINKING REMOVAL AND "RELATES TO":
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION DISPUTES AND THE
N.Y. CONVENTION
Holly Wilson *
INTRODUCTION
To most, "The New York Convention" may sound like a gigantic
conference center filled with people wearing "I heart NY" shirts
and eating thin crust pizza, but for a small group of international
commercial litigators, it sounds like a trump card to end all trump
cards, a ticket into federal court and-eventually-out to arbitra-
tion.
The N.Y. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards ("Convention") is an obscure and infre-
quently utilized part of Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act
implementing the United Nation's Convention covering how to en-
force and recognize foreign arbitral awards and agreements.' One
of the marvels of the Convention is that it contains special, ex-
tremely defendant-friendly removal provisions. 2 Where these pro-
visions come to life though is in how the courts construe and en-
force them. Specifically, the Convention requires that a foreign
arbitration agreement "relate to" the subject matter of the case for
it to be removable, irrespective of diversity of citizenship or federal
question jurisdiction.3 The Fifth Circuit originally crafted a stand-
ard in Marathon Oil v. Ruhrgas, A.G. interpreting the "relates to"
requirement that struck the right balance to allow easy removal
* J.D., 2016, University of Richmond School of Law; B.A., 2013, Denison University.
A special thanks to Jamie Adkins, Andrea Mousouris, and Sarah Ashley Barnett for encour-
aging me in this endeavor. Thank you to my fierce female family tribe for enabling me to
embrace my ambition and teaching me that my voice matters.
1. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2012).
2. See id. § 205.
3. Id.
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but maintain structure.4 Now, however, the Fifth Circuit has cre-
ated a new standard in Beiser v. Weyler interpreting "relates to" so
broadly that the gate into federal court is blown right off of its
hinges.5 Alarmingly, more and more circuits are picking up the
Fifth Circuit's new test. 6 Many circuits though have yet to adopt
any test as these cases are very niche and come up only on occasion.
The Ruhrgas standard facilitated arbitration of international
contract claims without taking an aggressive approach and was
careful to allow only those truly foreign arbitration cases to proceed
into federal court.7 Conversely, Beiser aggressively rips these cases
from state courts and immediately ejects them to arbitration.8 This
article explores why the Ruhrgas standard is the superior standard
and why circuit courts (and district courts in undecided circuits)
should refuse to adopt the Beiser standard.
To begin, Part I explores the historical roots of the Convention,
discusses the evolution of its removal provisions, and explains how
it functions in the district courts today. Part II addresses the argu-
ments in favor of reverting to the Ruhrgas standard. This article
demonstrates that the current judicial interpretation of the Con-
vention's removal provisions under Beiser is too broad and that the
stricter construction under Ruhrgas should be re-adopted. Part II
examines three key reasons why the current Beiser standard is un-
workable: the current standard (1) leads to absurd results, (2) dis-
respects notions of federalism and strains comity, and (3) in con-
junction with the implementing legislation, shapes federal courts
into a procedural pass through and degrades the integrity of the
judicial system. Simultaneously, Part II explains why Ruhrgas
cures the ailments imparted by the Beiser standard.
Importantly, no opinion is offered on the preferential treatment
given to arbitration of international contract cases more generally.
Further, this article only addresses one of the many requirements 9
for removal under the Convention-the "relates to" requirement.
Jurisdictional challenges are what largely consume the district
4. 115 F.3d 315, 320-21 (5th Cir. 1997).
5. 284 F.3d 665, 669 (5th Cir. 2002).
6. See, e.g., Reid v. Doe Run Res. Corp., 701 F.3d 840, 843-44 (8th Cir. 2012); Infuturia
Glob. Ltd. v. Sequus Pharms., Inc. (Infuturia II), 631 F.3d 1133, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2011);
Goel v. Ramachandran, 823 F. Supp. 2d 206, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
7. See infra Part I.C.2.a.
8. See infra Part I.C.2.b.
9. See 9 U.S.C. § 205 (2012); infra Part I.C.2.
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courts in their handling of these cases.10 The "relates to" prong is
rightly one of the most litigated requirements for jurisdictional
consideration and thus is worth a deeper look.
I. BACKGROUND
Before the Convention's jurisdictional quirks can be analyzed,
one must understand where this esoteric piece of legislation came
from, how it operates, and how the courts are currently interpret-
ing it. Each is a significant piece of the puzzle in comprehending
how foreign parties capitalize on its breadth and why it should be
changed.
A. The History of the New York Convention
In the wake of World War II, countries around the world were
forced to tackle how to enforce foreign arbitral awards." Conse-
quently, in 1953, the International Chamber of Commerce invited
the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations to hold a
convention to explore possible resolutions. 12 The Council obliged
and called a conference to draft the United Nations Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 13
("U.N. Convention") and, further, "[t]o consider, if time per-
mit[ted], other possible measures for increasing the effectiveness
of arbitration in the settlement of private law disputes and to make
such recommendations as it may deem desirable." 14 The conference
met from May 20 to June 10, 1958.15 The United States and Russia
10. Jurisdiction is so heavily litigated because § 203's grant of original jurisdiction is
circumscribed. 9 U.S.C. § 203. Once district courts have jurisdiction, they are limited to
compel arbitration or confirm or vacate the award as long as the arbitration agreement is
valid. See Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co., 675 F.3d 355, 366-67 (4th Cir. 2012) ("When
these jurisdictional prerequisites have been satisfied, a district court is obliged to order ar-
bitration 'unless it finds that the [arbitration] agreement is null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed."') (alteration in original) (quoting Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitrial Awards, art. II, 1 3, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T.
2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3).
11. Leonard V. Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049,
1059 (1961).
12. Id.
13. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter U.N. Convention].
14. Economic and Social Council Res. 604 (XXI), at 6 (May 22, 1956).
15. Quigley, supra note 11, at 1059.
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attended along with forty-five other nations. 16 The conference for-
mally adopted the U.N. Convention and "also made several recom-
mendations to the Economic and Social Council for further
measures needed to increase the effectiveness of arbitration."17
"Ten nations signed the [U.N.] Convention on June 10, 1958, and
[thirteen] more nations signed it within the period open for signa-
ture-until December 31, 1958."18
Although the U.N. Convention was adopted by the conference in
1959, the United States did not accede to the convention until
eleven years later.19 Ambassador Richard D. Kearney delivered the
United States's accession on September 30, 1970, and President
Richard Nixon signed its implementing legislation, the Conven-
tion, Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act,20 into law on July
31, 1970.21 Together, they were effective on December 29, 1970, in
the United States. 22
The [U.N.] Convention provides general ground rules that signatory
and acceding nations must follow in the adjudication of disputes in
international arbitral agreements. It deals with the following princi-
pal issues: (1) what are the procedures for the enforcement of the ar-
bitral award; (2) did the court of original judgment have jurisdiction;
(3) is the judgment enforceable where entered; (4) when there is a con-
flict of laws question, was the correct law applied or will the judgment
subvert the laws of the contracting state where enforcement proceed-
ings are taking place; and, (5) when will the courts specifically enforce
a contract clause calling for arbitration? 23
The Convention "revers[ed] centuries of judicial hostility to ar-
bitration agreements, was designed to allow parties to avoid 'the
costliness and delays of litigation,' and to place arbitration agree-
ments 'upon the same footing as other contracts . . . ."' 2 4 One of the
paramount features of the Convention is that it allows for easy re-
moval and widens subject matter jurisdiction for federal courts.
16. Id. at 1059-60.
17. Id. at 1060.
18. Id.
19. U.N. Convention, supra note 13; Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84
Stat. 692 (1970) (current version at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2012)).
20. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208.
21. Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (1970).
22. Id.
23. Stanley L. Levine, United Nations Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention: United
States Accession, 2 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 67, 68 (1971).
24. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974) (alteration in original)
(footnote omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1, 2 (1924)).
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B. Removal Under the Convention
In order for a district court to take on a Convention case, like in
all cases, it must have subject matter jurisdiction. For a case that
begins in state court, the district court must have original jurisdic-
tion and removal jurisdiction. 25 Under the Convention, federal dis-
trict courts have original jurisdiction over an action or proceeding
"falling under the Convention," regardless of the amount in contro-
versy.26 While the twists and turns of the meaning of "falling under
the Convention" are discussed in more detail below, rest assured
that this is a very low standard. Section 205 of the Convention pro-
vides for removal where the subject matter "relates to an arbitra-
tion agreement or award falling under the Convention."27 Removal
may occur "any time before the trial [of the action or proceeding]."28
Ordinary removal procedure applies, except that the removal
grounds need only be shown in the removal petition, they need not
appear on the complaint's face. 29
The party asserting federal jurisdiction generally bears the bur-
den of proving that the case is properly in federal court.30 Lucky for
the party asserting federal jurisdiction, the burden is quite light-
so light, in fact, that the traditional well-pleaded complaint rule 31
does not apply to cases falling under the Convention. Instead, in
interpreting the language of § 205, the Fifth Circuit has stated:
This language does create one difference between the federal question
jurisdiction conferred by § 205 and most other forms of federal ques-
tion jurisdiction: it permits removal on the basis of a federal defense.
The language that the ground for removal "need not appear on the
25. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), 1446(c) (2012).
26. 9 U.S.C. § 203 (2012) ("An action or proceeding falling under the Convention shall
be deemed to arise under the laws and treaties of the United States. The district courts of
the United States (including the courts enumerated in section 460 of title 28) shall have
original jurisdiction over such an action or proceeding, regardless of the amount in contro-
versy.").
27. Id. § 205.
28. Id. Under § 205, the defendant may file its notice of removal "any time before the
trial." Id. The ordinary rules for timeliness under 28 U.S.C. § 1446 do not apply to cases
invoking removal jurisdiction under the Convention. See Sheinberg v. Princess Cruise
Lines, Ltd., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1351-52 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Acme Brick Co. v. Agrupacion
Exportadora de Maquinaria Ceramica, 855 F. Supp. 163, 166 (N.D. Tex. 1994); Dale Metals
Corp. v. Kiwa Chem. Ind. Co., Ltd., 442 F. Supp. 78, 81 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
29. 9 U.S.C. § 205.
30. See McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936).
31. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007).
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face of the complaint" explicitly abrogates the well-pleaded complaint
rule that normally keeps such defenses from serving as the basis for
federal question jurisdiction. But at the same time the statute permits
a defense based on an arbitration clause to serve as a grounds for re-
moval, it also directs us to treat such defenses the same way that we
treat offensive claims. That is, just as we determine whether a plain-
tiffs claim arises under federal law from the complaint alone, the stat-
ute directs us to determine whether a defendant's defense arises un-
der federal law from the "petition for removal" alone. 32
This abrogation led one district court to redub it as the "'artless'
pleading standard." 33 To find out whether the subject matter "re-
lates to an arbitration agreement or award falling under the Con-
vention" the court may now look through the complaint to the pe-
tition for removal and rest removal jurisdiction on a federal
defense. 34 This severely weakens the respondent's ability to keep a
case out of federal court.
Abrogation of the well-pleaded complaint rule is just one of the
symptoms of Congress's initial motivation for enacting the Conven-
tion. The Supreme Court has stated, "The goal of the Convention
... was to encourage the recognition and enforcement of commer-
cial arbitration agreements in international contracts and to unify
the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and
arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries." 35 The Su-
preme Court has recognized "the emphatic federal policy in favor
of arbitral dispute resolution" and "that federal policy applies with
special force in the field of international commerce."3 6 "[E]asy re-
moval is exactly what Congress intended in § 205."37 The U.N. Con-
vention and its implementing legislation "articulate a uniform pol-
icy in favor of enforcing agreements to arbitrate internationally"
and "demand that courts 'subordinate domestic notions of arbitra-
bility to the international policy favoring commercial arbitra-
tion."' 38
32. Beiser v. Weyler, 284 F.3d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 205).
33. Shilmann Rocbit, LLC v. Am. Blasting Consumables, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-06745, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137412, at *17 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 4, 2016) ("As a result, we are left with
more of an 'artless' pleading standard than the 'artful' pleading standard required by
Twombly and Iqbal.").
34. 9 U.S.C. § 205.
35. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974).
36. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985).
37. Beiser, 284 F.3d at 674 (citing McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters of Lon-
don, 944 F.2d 1199, 1209 (1991)).
38. ESAB Grp., Inc. v. Zurich Ins. PLC, 685 F.3d 376, 390 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting
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Usually, "[b]ecause removal jurisdiction raises significant feder-
alism concerns, [the court] must strictly construe removal jurisdic-
tion." 39 However, Congress intended § 205 to provide for "easy re-
moval" and to "confer jurisdiction liberally." 40 Thus, § 205 is not
subject to the same strict construction. 41 The Fifth Circuit has de-
scribed § 205 as "one of the broadest removal provisions" and "em-
phasized that the general rule of construing removal statutes
strictly against removal 'cannot apply to Convention Act cases be-
cause in these instances, Congress created special removal rights
to channel cases into federal court."' 42
C. Current State of the Law
Given Congress's backdrop heavily favoring arbitration, one
would think that utilizing the Convention to get into federal court 4 3
would be clear-cut-and it generally is in a majority of cases. The
confusion now is actually how to stay out of federal court. The
courts have widened the (already broad) policy so much that it
seems almost impossible to keep a case in state court. 44 For proper
removal under the Convention the removing party must prove two
statutory requisites, (1) that the agreement "falls under the Con-
vention" by way of § 203 and (2) that the subject matter "relates
to" such an agreement by way of § 205.45 When one peels back the
curtain on these two requirements, a sweeping policy favoring ar-
bitration is revealed. Prior to 2002, these requirements were inter-
preted much more narrowly, but the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 639).
39. Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing
Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941)); see Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp.,
313 U.S. at 108 (noting that federalism concerns call for "the strict construction" of the re-
moval statute).
40. Beiser, 284 F.3d at 674.
41. See id.
42. Acosta v. Master Maint. & Constr. Inc., 452 F.3d 373, 377 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting
McDermott, 944 F.2d at 1213).
43. Getting "into federal court" really is not the most precise language because once the
case is in federal court, it is immediately ushered into arbitration or remanded to state court.
However, because the legal principles directing a case into federal court are duplicative of
those guiding it into arbitration, if a party manages to successfully remove, they almost
guarantee a dismissal in favor of arbitration. This is discussed infra Part I.C.
44. See Beiser, 284 F.3d at 674; see also infra, Part I.C.2.b (explaining the current stand-
ard under Beiser).
45. 9 U.S.C. §§ 203, 205 (2012).
2018] 457
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Beiser v. Weyler opened the floodgates. 46 The following sections will
review the current state of the law on these two requirements.
1. The "Falling Under the Convention" Requirement
An agreement "falls under" the Convention when "(1) there is an
agreement in writing to arbitrate the dispute, (2) the agreement
provides for arbitration in the territory of a Convention signatory,
(3) the agreement arises out of a commercial legal relationship, and
(4) a party to the agreement is not an American citizen."47 Because
courts generally interpret these requirements by looking to the
plain meaning, the "falls under" prong of the test is easily satis-
fied.4 8 Over 120 countries have signed the Convention; 49 this em-
phasizes a global policy favoring arbitration and broadens the
scope of agreements covered by the Convention. The only occasion-
ally misunderstood requirement is that "a party to the agreement
is not an American citizen."50 The term "party" is used in reference
to the agreement-not the litigation.51 Thus, the requirement is not
that the party to the agreement currently involved in the litigation
is not an American citizen, the requirement is only that a party to
the agreement is not an American citizen. 52 However, it seems that
this has only come up in a handful of cases because, commonly, the
party to the litigation is also a party to the agreement and there-
fore not an American citizen.
46. Compare Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, A.G., 115 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 1997), vacated
on other grounds en banc, 145 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 526 U.S. 574 (1999) (requiring
a relevant arbitration agreement between the parties to the litigation for § 205 jurisdiction),
with Beiser, 284 F.3d at 674 (holding that removal is permissible if an arbitration agreement
"could conceivably impact the disposition of the case" (emphasis added)).
47. Francisco v. Stolt Achievement MT, 293 F.3d 270, 273 (5th Cir. 2002); see also 9
U.S.C. § 202.
48. See, e.g., Francisco, 293 F.3d at 274-76. Admittedly, the test is very straightfor-
ward. Most parties removing under § 205 do not have to think twice about these require-
ments. As long as there is one foreign party to the agreement and it is in writing, these
requirements are usually satisfied. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 202, 205.
49. U.N. Convention, supra note 13.
50. Francisco, 293 F.3d at 270, 273 (interpreting 9 U.S.C § 202). See, e.g., Shilmann
Rocbit, LLC v. Am. Blasting Consumables, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-06745, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
137412, at *19-20 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 4, 2016) (examining the contractual parties' citizenship);
Memorandum of Law in Support of Shilmann Rocbit, LLC's Motion to Remand at 14, Shil-
mann, 2016 U.S. Dist. 137412, at *10 (confusing parties to the litigation and parties to the
contract).
51. See Shilmann, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137412, at *10.
52. See id. at *9-11.
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2. The "Relates To" Requirement
Of more significance, and the focus of this article, is the "relates
to" requirement. The removing party must show that the arbitra-
tion agreement "relates to" the subject matter of the litigation.
Prior to 2002, the court used a standard just shy of requiring priv-
ity, focusing on the plaintiffs relationship to the arbitration agree-
ment. In other words, if the plaintiff had nothing to do with the
arbitration agreement, the arbitration agreement did not "relate
to" the subject matter of the litigation. In 2002, however, the court
shifted gears and created a broader standard.
a. Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, A. G.-The Old Standard
In Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, A.G., the Fifth Circuit articu-
lated the standard for "relates to" under the Convention.53 In sum,
the "relates to" prong required that the plaintiffs either be a signa-
tory to the agreement or have some other tangible, commercial le-
gal relationship to the defendant, harm, or agreement.
The test of Ruhrgas depends on the relationship of the parties
and the plaintiffs' claim to the arbitration agreement.
The Ruhrgas factors have been summarized as follows: (1) whether
the plaintiffs signed the arbitration agreement; (2) whether the plain-
tiffs sought damages under the contract that contains the arbitration
agreement; (3) whether the plaintiffs and the defendant had any con-
tractual relationship; and (4) whether the plaintiffs sought a remedy
for wrongs done to a signatory of the agreement. 54
The plaintiffs sued a German gas supplier, Ruhrgas, in Texas
state court in connection with the plaintiffs' construction and drill-
ing operations in the Heimdal field in the North Sea.55 Ruhrgas
removed the action to federal court under § 205.56 "Ruhrgas
acknowledge [d] that none of the Marathon plaintiffs ha[d] any con-
tractual relationship with Ruhrgas and that none of the plaintiffs
53. 115 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 1997), vacated on other grounds en banc, 145 F.3d 211 (5th
Cir. 1998), rev'd, 526 U.S. 574 (1999). The Supreme Court decision in Ruhrgas did not dis-
cuss the issue of removal under the Convention. See generally Ruhrgas AG, 526 U.S. at 574.
Instead, the Supreme Court reversed on a personal jurisdiction issue. See id. at 588.
54. Susan L. Karamanian, The Road to the International Tribunal and Beyond: Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration and United States Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INTL L. REV. 17,
83 (2002).
55. Ruhrgas, A.G., 115 F.3d at 317.
56. Id.
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ever signed an arbitration agreement."5 7 Nevertheless, as part of
its attempt to remove, Ruhrgas asserted that the subject matter
related to an arbitration agreement falling under the Convention
because the plaintiffs' claims were "attempt[s] to enforce provi-
sions of the Heimdal Gas Agreement, an agreement to which [the
plaintiffs were] not parties."58 Further, Ruhrgas argued that one of
the plaintiffs, Marathon Petroleum Norway ("MPN"), had an obli-
gation to arbitrate all disputes connected to the Heimdal Gas
Agreement, and that the suit at hand was an "attempt to circum-
vent" that obligation. 59 The Fifth Circuit noted that the real inquiry
was whether any relevant arbitration agreement existed and de-
cided that in this case, there was not one.60 In reaching this con-
clusion, the Fifth Circuit found compelling (1) that redress was not
being sought for MPN, and (2) that the suit was not one for breach
of contract. 61
The Ruhrgas test made the plaintiff the epicenter of the inquiry
and required that some contractual connection between the plain-
tiff and the defendant exist. While not formally implementing a
privity requirement, the strictness of the Ruhrgas test comes close
to such an interpretation. Ruhrgas was ultimately vacated on
other grounds by the Supreme Court.62 When the question arose
later in Beiser v. Weyler, the Fifth Circuit abandoned its previous
common sense approach and took a different, more lenient route.63
b. Beiser v. Weyler-The New Standard
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's decision in Beiser
primarily affected the "relates to" prong by destroying the semi-
signatory requirement set up in Ruhrgas.64 The Fifth Circuit all
but did a 180-degree turn and opened the door to the federal courts
in this arena-wide.65 After Beiser, the courts' approach to inter-
57. Id. at 321 n.25.
58. Id. at 321.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Marathon Oil Co. v. A.G. Ruhrgas, 145 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc), rev'd,
526 U.S. 574 (1999).
63. See 284 F.3d 665, 667, 669-70 (5th Cir. 2002).
64. See id. at 669-70.
65. See generally id.
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national arbitration cases can only be characterized as aggres-
sively dismissive. The Fifth Circuit held that "whenever an arbi-
tration agreement 'falling under the Convention' could conceivably
affect the outcome of the plaintiffs case, the agreement 'relates to'
an arbitration agreement that falls under the Convention and can
be removed from state to federal court. 66
In Beiser, the plaintiff, Fred Beiser, was the director and sole
employee of an LLC, Horizon Energy. 67 Horizon Energy contracted
with Roy M. Huffington, Inc., to acquire development rights to an
oil and gas field in Hungary.68 Beiser signed this agreement on be-
half of Horizon Energy in his official capacity.69 Simultaneously,
Horizon Energy entered into a line of credit agreement with Hun-
garian Horizon Energy Limited ("Hungarian Horizon"), which pro-
vided financing for the project. 70 Beiser also signed this agreement
in his official capacity, on behalf of Horizon Energy.71 "Both agree-
ments contained clauses providing for the arbitration of any dis-
pute in London." 72
Beiser filed suit against Roy M. Huffington, Inc., Hungarian
Horizon, Horizon Energy, and other individual parties, claiming
that he was "wrongfully deprived ... of his financial interest in the
Hungary field." 7 3 He filed suit in state court alleging various state
law claims.74 The defendants removed the case to federal court and
moved to compel arbitration, and Beiser moved to remand to state
court on the grounds that he was a nonsignatory to the agreements
and that those agreements therefore did not "relate to" the subject
matter of his suit.75 The district court denied Beiser's motion and
66. Id. at 669.
67. Id. at 666.
68. Id. at 667.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. The agreements at issue clearly met the "falling under the Convention" prong.
This was undisputed. Id. "[Beiser] did not contest that the arbitration agreements 'fall[]
under the Convention' within the meaning of § 205." Id. (alteration in original).
73. Id. at 666-67.
74. Id. at 667.
75. Id.
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granted the motion to compel arbitration. 76 Beiser appealed, chal-
lenging the court's subject-matter jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 205
removal jurisdiction.77
The Fifth Circuit concluded that Beiser's claims were related to
the arbitration agreement because "[d]eveloping [his] case [would]
necessarily involve explaining the scope and operation" of the
agreement, and the "suit at least has a 'connection with' the con-
tracts governing the transaction out of which his claims arise."78 It
was conceivable that a court could pierce the corporate veil and
hold Beiser personally responsible for the contracts. 79 Thus, the
court held that "[b]ecause the arbitration agreements could con-
ceivably affect the disposition of Beiser's claims, those agreements
'relate to' his claims, and the district court had removal jurisdiction
under § 205."8o Underscoring the broad scope of § 205 removal, the
Fifth Circuit stated that "absent the rare frivolous petition for re-
moval, as long as the defendant claims in its petition that an arbi-
tration clause provides a defense, the district court will have juris-
diction to decide the merits of that claim."8 ' Moreover, the Fifth
Circuit referred to the "relates to" requirement as a "low bar." 82
The Beiser Court rested its conclusion on two practical grounds.
First, the court believed that a signatory requirement would "re-
quire a court to front-load a merits inquiry into an examination of
jurisdiction." 83 Specifically, the court was concerned about requir-
ing the district court to determine whether Beiser would definitely
be bound to the agreements.84 Next, the court noted that because
"a district court's [decision to] remand for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be reviewed by an appellate court under 28
U.S.C. § 1447(d), remanding the case to state court would effec-
tively remove the matter from the federal court system for good."85
76. Id.
77. Id. at 667-68.
78. Id. at 669.
79. Id. at 670.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 671-72.
82. Id. at 669.
83. William W. Park et al., International Commercial Dispute Resolution, 37 INT'L LAW.
445, 449 (2003).
84. Beiser, 284 F.3d at 670.
85. Park, supra note 83, at 450 (citing Beiser, 284 F.3d at 672).
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This would be counter to the aims of the Convention and would
strain federal-state court relations.
The standard set forth in Beiser has become the model other cir-
cuits are slowly adopting.86 Its broad interpretation of "relates to"
ushers in a large class of cases where the relationship of a party to
an agreement "falling under the Convention" is tangential and cir-
cumstantial. Indeed, a party's status as a signatory is no longer
relevant to the analysis at all. As long as the agreement "falling
under the Convention" could conceivably affect the disposition of
the plaintiffs claims, removal gets the green light.
c. Infuturia Global Ltd. v. Sequus Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Since Beiser, the Ninth Circuit has agreed with the Fifth Circuit
and adopted wholesale Beiser's interpretation of "relates to."87 In
Infuturia Global Ltd. v. Sequus Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Ninth
Circuit proclaimed: "The phrase 'relates to' is plainly broad, and
has been interpreted to convey sweeping removal jurisdiction in
analogous statutes" and "[n]othing in § 205 urges a narrower con-
struction." 88 The court expressly rejected the proposition that § 205
required the parties to be in privity of contract, finding that the
language of § 205 "focuses only on the relatedness of the 'subject
matter of [the] action. . . to an arbitration agreement,"' not "on the
relatedness of the parties."89
In this case, the plaintiff, Infuturia, a British Virgin Islands cit-
izen, entered into a license agreement with Yissum Research and
Development Company, an Israeli company, giving Infuturia an
exclusive license for a pharmaceutical product developed by Pro-
fessor Yechezkel Barenholtz, an Israeli citizen. 90 The license agree-
ment contained an arbitration clause mandating "arbitration of
any dispute 'connected in any way to the implementation of [the
license] [a]greement."' 91 Later, Yissum Research and Development
86. See, e.g., Reid v. Doe Run Res. Corp., 701 F.3d 840, 843-44 (8th Cir. 2012) (applying
the Beiser standard in holding that "a case may be removed under § 205 if the arbitration
could conceivably affect the outcome of the case"); Infuturia II, 631 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir.
2011) (applying the Beiser standard in holding that "[t]he phrase 'relates to' is plainly broad,
and has been interpreted to convey sweeping removal jurisdiction in analogous statutes").
87. See Infuturia II, 631 F.3d at 1137-38.
88. Id. at 1138.
89. Id. (alterations in original).
90. Id. at 1135.
91. Id.
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Company entered into another license agreement with Sequus
Pharmaceuticals, a U.S. citizen, for the same pharmaceutical prod-
uct.92
Infuturia sued all other parties in California state court alleging
tortious interference with its original license agreement. 93 The case
was stayed and the parties went to arbitration where Yissum ulti-
mately prevailed. 94 An Israeli court confirmed the award, and after
the stay was lifted in California state court, Infuturia requested
confirmation of the award and asserted new claims against the de-
fendants. 95 The defendants defended on the grounds of collateral
estoppel, an affirmative defense. Borrowing from Beiser, the Infu-
turia court held that "where the defendant relies on the affirmative
defense of collateral estoppel regarding issues already resolved
against the plaintiff in arbitration, the arbitral award 'could con-
ceivably affect the outcome' of the case" and so removal was
proper. 96
II. DISCUSSION
The Beiser standard, although picking up steam with circuits
around the country, should be abandoned in favor of the old Ruhr-
gas standard. The breadth of the Beiser standard leads to absurd
results, destroys any balance between the state and federal judici-
aries, and too widely refers disputes to arbitration-converting the
federal court into a mere procedural pass through. The Ruhrgas
standard avoids these problems and maintains the integrity of the
federal and state judiciaries. Each of the above arguments are ad-
dressed, in turn, below.
A. Absurdity
It is easy to see how the pillars of the Beiser decision may lead
to absurd results. One of the most concerning results is that two
92. Id. at 1135-36.
93. Id. at 1135.
94. Id. at 1136.
95. Infuturia Glob. Ltd. v. Sequus Pharms., Inc. (Infuturia I), No. C 08-4871 SBA, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13570, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2009).
96. Infuturia II, 631 F.3d at 1138-39 (quoting Beiser v. Weyler, 284 F.3d 665, 669 (5th
Cir. 2002)).
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American companies could potentially be sent to arbitration in a
foreign country. In Shilmann Rocbit, LLC v. American Blasting
Consumables, Inc., this exact scenario occurred.97
In Shilmann, the plaintiff, Shilmann Rocbit, LLC, a West Vir-
ginia citizen, and Riplog Pty Ltd., a South African citizen, entered
into an Exclusive Distribution Agreement under which the plain-
tiff was to be the exclusive distributor for Riplog's "hole plugs."98
Of course, this contract contained "a dispute resolution clause re-
quiring all claims 'aris[ing] out of or . .. connect[ed] with' the
[a]greement to be arbitrated in South Africa under South African
law." 99 Riplog saw an opportunity, got crafty, and sold its hole
plugs to its own affiliated company, American Blasting Consuma-
bles, a West Virginia citizen, in violation of the agreement. 100 Shil-
mann, in turn, got crafty. Instead of suing Riplog, with whom Shil-
mann would have to arbitrate the dispute in South Africa,
Shilmann sued Riplog's West Virginia affiliate, American Blasting,
for tortious interference.1 0 1 After Shilmann filed the state court
complaint, but before the action was removed, Riplog made a par-
tial assignment of rights to payment under the agreement to Amer-
ican Blasting, and American Blasting brought counterclaims for
Shilmann's account delinquencies. 10 2 This partial assignment was
made, presumably, in hopes of securing federal subject matter ju-
risdiction under the Convention based on the counterclaims. Rip-
log's efforts, however, were unnecessary at best and collusive at
worst. The court correctly disregarded the counterclaims in its de-
termination of subject matter jurisdiction. 103 Regardless, American
Blasting was able to force Shilmann into federal court. 104
The court in Shilmann determined that the agreement plainly
fell under the Convention because "[t]he agreement [was] in writ-
ing, South Africa [was] a signatory to the Convention, South Africa
[was] the seat of arbitration, . . . the parties [had] a commercial
legal relationship," and "Riplog, a citizen of South Africa, was still
97. No. 2:16-cv-06745, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137412, at *2 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 4, 2016).
98. Id.
99. Id. (alterations in original).
100. Id.
101. Id. at *3-4.
102. Id.
103. Id. at *4 n.2.
104. Id. at *9-10.
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a party to the Agreement."105 The court then applied the Beiser
standard to conclude that the agreement "related to" the subject
matter of the case. 10 6 The court reasoned,
The Complaint in this case gives no grounds for removal jurisdiction,
whether under the Convention or otherwise. ... Thus, removal, if
proper, must be based on a federal defense. See Beiser, 284 F.3d at
671. Accordingly, "the statute directs us to determine whether a de-
fendant's defense arises under federal law from the 'petition for re-
moval' alone." Id.
.. . [D]espite the defendant's argument and irrespective of the par-
tial assignment, it is at least conceivable that the arbitration clause
in the Agreement could affect the outcome of plaintiffs claim based on
statements in the Notice of Removal. Here, as in Beiser, "[d]eveloping
[plaintiffs] case [would] necessarily involve explaining the scope and
operation" of the Agreement and the "suit at least has a 'connection
with' the contracts governing the transaction out of which his claims
arise." Beiser, 284 F.3d at 669. In order to determine whether the de-
fendant tortiously interfered with the Agreement, the court would
have to delve into the depths of the terms of the Agreement, especially
because the crux of both the Agreement and the plaintiffs tortious
interference claim is the plaintiffs exclusivity rights. Notably, unlike
the plaintiff in Beiser, the plaintiff in this case is a signatory to the
Agreement-making the connection between the Agreement and the
subject matter of this case undeniably stronger than that in Beiser.107
From this, two domestic, non-diverse companies landed in federal
court and were ultimately sent to South Africa to arbitrate their
dispute-an absurd result.10 8
Had the court applied the Ruhrgas standard, it could have
avoided this absurdity. Just as in Ruhrgas, the plaintiffs claim
was not one for breach of contract, a fact the Ruhrgas court found
compelling. 109 Further, the court would have looked to see if any
relevant arbitration agreement existed and likely would have con-
cluded that the arbitration agreement between Riplog and Shil-
mann was not relevant to the dispute between American Blasting
and Shilmann, especially because American Blasting and Shil-
mann were only contractually related by way of a partial assign-
ment of collection rights.1 10 More directly, the court would have
105. Id. at *10.
106. Id. at *10-12.
107. Id. at *15--16 (fourth, fifth, and sixth alterations in original) (footnote omitted).
108. Id. at *21-22.
109. Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, A.G., 115 F.3d 315, 321 (5th Cir. 1997).
110. Shilmann, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137412, at *3, *15.
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looked to the distilled factors of Ruhrgas: "(1) whether the plain-
tiffs signed the arbitration agreement; (2) whether the plaintiffs
sought damages under the contract that contains the arbitration
agreement; (3) whether the plaintiffs and the defendant had any
contractual relationship; and (4) whether the plaintiffs sought a
remedy for wrongs done to a signatory of the agreement."111 In
Shilmann, the plaintiff signed the arbitration agreement and
sought a remedy for the wrongs done by a signatory. 112 However,
factors two and three cut against a finding of "relates to" because
Shilmann's claim was not for damages "under the contract" and
the contractual relationship between the parties was not relevant
to its claim. 113
Shilmann's determination is an absurdity because the parties
were not playing in the international arena. As domestic parties,
Congress's policy favoring arbitration of commercial disputes,
which "applies with special force in the field of international com-
merce," loses its momentum when neither party is a foreign citi-
zen. 114 In a Ruhrgas analysis, it would be extremely difficult for
domestic parties to duck under the protection of the Convention
because either (1) they would be directly, contractually related and
thus the agreement would not "fall under" the Convention; or (2)
they would be somehow tangentially related but not able to bring
a breach of contract claim (as was the case in Shilmann).
Shilmann presents a unique case study because it involves the
opposite of the problem presented in Ruhrgas. In Ruhrgas, signifi-
cantly, two of the plaintiffs were not signatories. 115 In Shilmann,
the defendant was not a signatory. 116 Demonstrably, Ruhrgas, at
the very least, gives courts more "wiggle room" to avoid absurd re-
sults, such as allowing two domestic, non-diverse companies to
land in federal court by virtue of legislation focused on interna-
tional disputes.
111. Karamanian, supra note 54, at 83.
112. Shilmann, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137412, at *2-3, *16.
113. Id. at *3-5.
114. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631
(1985).
115. Ruhrgas, A.G., 115 F.3d at 321.
116. Shilmann, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137412, at *16 ("Notably, unlike the plaintiff in
Beiser, the plaintiff in this case is a signatory to the Agreement-making the connection
between the Agreement and the subject matter of this case undeniably stronger than that
in Beiser.").
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Indeed, the Ruhrgas standard, with a focus on the relationship
of the parties and the relationship of the plaintiff and his claim to
the arbitration agreement, is a more holistic, common-sense ap-
proach to jurisdiction under the Convention and is much more con-
sistent with the purpose of the Convention and tenants of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. Ruhrgas's definition of "relates to"
precludels] removal merely due to the presence of an arbitration
clause in a contract not having a direct bearing on the plaintiffs claim.
At the same time, it recognize[s] that a claim not based solely on the
contract containing the arbitration clause, but which would implicate
the clause in a meaningful manner, could give grounds for removal."'
Ruhrgas comes close to a privity requirement but leaves room to
uphold the aims of Congress while also avoiding absurd results.
Beiser's greatest departure, which tends to make its results more
absurd, is its abrogation of the well-pleaded complaint rule. 118 By
allowing the district court to now look through the complaint to the
notice of removal for grounds to remove, absurd results are more
readily reached as more power is handed to the removing party. 119
Removal now turns on how well the removing party can spin the
arbitration agreement's relation to the case. 120 With Ruhrgas, the
well-pleaded complaint rule, which kept the court's focus rightly
on the complaint in question, had not been expressly abrogated,
thereby avoiding a power imbalance and a heavy-handed approach
to Convention cases. 121 For the same reasons, the Ruhrgas stand-
ard better serves the principles of comity and federalism, as dis-
cussed below.
B. Comity
Next, Ruhrgas manages to strike the right balance so that the
federal courts do not compromise the principles of comity. The
Beiser standard opens the door to federal court so wide that it dis-
rupts fundamental notions of federalism and runs counter to the
principles of comity, stealing cases traditionally left to the states-
contract disputes.
117. Karamanian, supra note 54, at 84.
118. See Beiser v. Weyler, 284 F.3d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 2002).
119. Id.
120. See generally Ruhrgas, A.G., 115 F.3d 315 (stating that "the issue is whether any
relevant arbitration agreement exists").
121. Id. at 320-21.
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Comity is an age-old principle congruent with the ideals of fed-
eralism where courts strive to maintain a friendly and respectful
relationship while acting efficiently and without conflict. 122 One
usually encounters the concept of comity in the international arena
when considering the question of whether United States laws, pol-
icies, or practices are in conflict with another country's comparable
laws, policies, or practices. In this specific context, however, we
consider comity between the state and federal courts in deciding
contractual disputes, albeit international ones. "Comity . .. serves
to ensure that 'the National Government, anxious though it may
be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, al-
ways endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with
the legitimate activities of the States."' 123 In sum, "[t]he principle
[of comity] is that a court should not assume to disturb another
court's disposition of a controversy unless there are good reasons
for doing so." 12 4
Indeed, the Beiser court was concerned about comity, but be-
lieved that a more lenient standard would facilitate federal-state
court relations rather than hinder them. 125 The court believed it
122. See Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413, 417 (2010); Rhines v. Weber, 544
U.S. 269, 273-74 (2005); Doe v. Va. Dept. of State Police, 713 F.3d 745, 753 (4th Cir. 2013),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1538 (2014); O'Sullivan v. City of Chicago, 396 F.3d 843, 868 (7th
Cir. 2005); Penn-America Ins. Co. v. Coffey, 368 F.3d 409, 412 (4th Cir. 2004); Gilbertson v.
Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2004).
123. Levin, 560 U.S. at 431 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)).
124. In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 127
P.3d 882, 899 (Ariz. 2006) (second alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 78 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1982)).
125. Beiser v. Weyler, 284 F.3d 665, 674-75 (5th Cir. 2002). Specifically, the court rea-
soned:
Moreover, § 205 does not interfere with state courts as much as ordinary re-
moval under the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441. When a case is
removed under § 1441, it will often remain in federal court until its conclusion.
Under § 205, however, the federal issue in cases will often be resolved early
enough to permit remand to the state court for a decision on the merits. The
arbitrability of a dispute will ordinarily be the first issue the district court de-
cides after removal under § 205. If the district court decides that the arbitra-
tion clause does not provide a defense, and no other grounds for federal juris-
diction exist, the court must ordinarily remand the case back to state court.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (granting district court discretion to remand all claims
in which state law predominates); Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser
Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that when all federal claims
are resolved early in a lawsuit and only state law claims remain, the district
court almost always should remand to the state court); Wong v. Stripling, 881
F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 1989) (same). Except for state law claims that turn out
to be subject to arbitration, § 205 will rarely permanently deprive a state court
of the power to decide claims properly brought before it. The district court will
ordinarily remand those cases that turn out not to be subject to arbitration,
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should be easier to keep a Convention case in federal court because
a remand order is unreviewable. 126 Thus, once remanded, the case
would have to stay in state court. 127 This, the court believed, would
strain federal-state court relations and be counter to the aims of
the Convention. 12 8 The position taken by the Fifth Circuit is an ide-
alistic one. It assumes that there will be cases left to remand to
state court. The standard the Fifth Circuit created, however, al-
most never allows for remand because of its overbreadth. Thus, its
reasoning is faulty, and this standard actually serves federalism in
an opposite way than intended.
If one ascribes to the belief that federal courts should have the
sole power to decide international arbitration agreement cases,
then it is simple to understand that federal courts would not be
happy about remanding cases to state court. The Fifth Circuit,
however, failed to examine the other side of the coin. Making it
easier to stay in federal court could just as easily anger state courts
that are intimately familiar with common law state court contract
claims. Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit had a good thing going under
Ruhrgas and tinkered with a standard that struck the right bal-
ance.
Under Ruhrgas, the state courts have a sliver of jurisdiction,
where the plaintiff has no relation to the arbitration agreement. 129
This tiny corner of Convention cases hands state courts a piece of
the pie without really handing them anything at all. In other
words, federal courts get to keep the meat of the Convention cases
while creating the so-called cohesive body of federal law and state
courts get to keep some modicum of their precious state court
claims and self-respect. Under Beiser, there is no more pretending.
State courts essentially have no jurisdictionl 30-case in point, Shil-
mann.1 3 1 The Fifth Circuit clearly did not critically contemplate the
such that the state court will be able to resolve the merits of the dispute. Sec-
tion 205 therefore raises fewer federalism problems than the general removal
statute, § 1441: except in arbitrable cases, it will ordinary [sic] permit state
courts to resolve the ultimate issues in a case.
Id.
126. Id. at 672.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 672-73.
129. Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, A.G., 115 F.3d 315, 320-21 (5th Cir. 1997).
130. But see Samsun Logix Corp. v. Bank of China, 740 F. Supp. 2d 484, 489 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (applying Beiser and concluding that "[t]he incantation of the word 'arbitration' some-
where in the record of a case does not convey federal jurisdiction").
131. See supra Part II.A.
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extent of disruption to the state courts when crafting the Beiser
standard. As a result, federalism suffers for the price of creating a
cohesive body of federal law.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has proclaimed that ordinary re-
moval is to be strictly construed due to federalism concerns.13 2 Spe-
cifically, the Supreme Court has stated,
[T]he policy of the successive acts of Congress regulating the jurisdic-
tion of federal courts is one calling for the strict construction of such
legislation [defining removal]. The power reserved to the states under
the Constitution to provide for the determination of controversies in
their courts, may be restricted only by the action of Congress in con-
formity to the Judiciary Articles of the Constitution. "Due regard for
the rightful independence of state governments, which should actuate
federal courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their own ju-
risdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined."1 33
Of course, following this logic, a liberal construction would be
counter to federalism concerns and aggravate the long-standing
notions of comity. Confusingly though, the Fifth Circuit adopted an
extremely liberal standard under Beiser, yet concluded that it best
served federalism concerns. Although the court in Beiser loosened
the requirements for removal in this context in the name of feder-
alism, it ultimately placed more strain on comity and rebuffed Su-
preme Court precedent. The Ruhrgas standard would be the right
compromise, a stricter standard than Beiser but respectful of the
aims of the Convention.
C. Procedural Pass Through Counter to Aims of the Convention
The Beiser standard may have been straightforward at its incep-
tion, but the courts have transformed the path "to" federal court
into more of a winding, thorny path "through" federal court. By de-
molishing the chance for a case to stay in state court, the Fifth Cir-
cuit foreclosed the ability of any court to decide the merits of these
cases as long as an enforceable arbitration agreement exists. Alt-
hough Ruhrgas would also be subject to the Convention's auto-
matic referral to arbitration provision, its more remand-able
standard preserves the ability of courts to decide the merits of Con-
vention cases.
132. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941).
133. Id. (quoting Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934)).
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Section 203's grant of original jurisdiction ultimately turns out
to be fleeting. Once the district court obtains original jurisdiction
under § 203 and removal jurisdiction under § 205, its hands are
tied to one of three options: to compel, confirm, or vacate an arbi-
tral award. 134 Astoundingly counter to the lauded priority to create
a "federal body of law," the district court has no authority to decide
the merits of the dispute. 135 Even more interesting is that the in-
quiry to determine whether an arbitration agreement is enforcea-
ble is duplicative of the inquiry into whether the agreement "falls
under" the Convention as required by § 202.136 Specifically, the test
is whether:
(1) there is an agreement in writing within the meaning of the Con-
vention; (2) the agreement provides for arbitration in the territory of
a signatory of the Convention; (3) the agreement arises out of a legal
relationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered commer-
cial; and (4) a party to the agreement is not an American citizen, or
that the commercial relationship has some reasonable relation with
one or more foreign states. 137
"When these jurisdictional prerequisites have been satisfied, a dis-
trict court is obliged to order arbitration 'unless it finds that the
[arbitration] agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable
of being performed."' 138
The interplay between the Beiser standard and § 202 is concern-
ing because it transforms the federal courts into a procedural pass
through-an express ride out of federal court and into arbitration.
The two inquiries, removal jurisdiction and enforceability of the
arbitration agreement, are collapsed on top of each other, making
a merits-based decision in the United States impossible. The Ruhr-
gas standard would not cure this problem completely, but it would
certainly help. By reserving some jurisdiction to the state courts,
the possibility of a merits-based decision remains.
134. Holzer v. Mondadori, No. 12 Civ. 5234, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37168, at *19
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2013) (citing Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. Ltd. v. Saint Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 668 F.3d 60, 71 (2d Cir. 2012)); see Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co., 675
F.3d 355, 366-67 (4th Cir. 2012); Beiser v. Weyler, 284 F.3d 665, 675 (5th Cir. 2002) ("The
district court will ordinarily remand those cases that turn out not to be subject to arbitra-
tion, such that the state court will be able to resolve the merits of the dispute."); see,
e.g., Goel v. Ramachandran, 823 F. Supp. 2d 206, 216-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (remanding action
to state court when party who had removed under § 205 did not seek to compel arbitration).
135. See Goel, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 213 (citing Beiser, 284 F.3d at 675).
136. Aggarao, 675 F.3d at 369.
137. Id. at 366 (quoting Balen v. Holland Am. Line Inc., 583 F.3d 647, 654-55 (9th Cir.
2009)).
138. Id. at 366-67 (alteration in original) (quoting U.N. Convention, supra note 13, at
art. II, 1 3).
472 [Vol. 52:451
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION DISPUTES
CONCLUSION
The current judicial interpretation of the Convention's removal
provisions under Beiser is, simply too broad, and the stricter con-
struction under Ruhrgas should be re-adopted. This is so because
the Beiser standard: (1) leads to absurd results; (2) disrespects no-
tions of federalism and strains comity; and (3) in conjunction with
the implementing legislation, shapes federal courts into a proce-
dural pass through and degrades the integrity of the judicial sys-
tem. In rethinking removal under the Ruhrgas standard, the Fifth
Circuit power-played the state courts and tied the district courts'
hands. Further, because this small piece of legislation is not com-
monly utilized, the law created when it is utilized is even more im-
portant. To this end, circuit courts that have yet to address this
issue should think carefully about the distinction between the
Ruhrgas and Beiser standards and should opt to take on the Ruhr-
gas standard.
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